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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides an attractive means for securing 
communications in optical fibre networks.  However, deployment of the 
technology has been hampered by the frequent need for dedicated dark fibres 
to segregate the very weak quantum signals from conventional traffic.  Up until 
now the coexistence of QKD with data has been limited to bandwidths that are 
orders of magnitude below those commonly employed in fibre optic 
communication networks.  Using an optimised wavelength divisional 
multiplexing scheme, we transport QKD and the prevalent 100 Gb/s data format 
in the forward direction over the same fibre for the first time.  We show a full 
quantum encryption system operating with a bandwidth of 200 Gb/s over a 100 
km fibre.  Exploring the ultimate limits of the technology by experimental 
measurements of the Raman noise, we demonstrate it is feasible to combine 
QKD with 10 Tb/s of data over a 50 km link.  These results suggest it will be 
possible to integrate QKD and other quantum photonic technologies into high 
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bandwidth data communication infrastructures, thereby allowing their 
widespread deployment.  Most demonstrations of QKD1-2 to date have used dark 
fibre, in which the quantum signals are transmitted separately from the conventional 
data3-5.  However, these additional dedicated links are not always available, and even 
when they are, can be prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of applications.  
Thus it is imperative for cost effective deployment of the technology, that QKD signals 
share the same fibre as conventional data6.  This is very challenging as the data lasers 
are typically 8 orders of magnitude stronger and produce a broad background 
spectrum of scattered light that can overwhelm the much weaker quantum signals7 
and experimental demonstrations to date have been limited to data bandwidths of a 
few tens of Gb/s, orders of magnitude less than the bandwidths commonly employed 
on links in fibre optic communications7-12.   
In this report we establish that quantum communication is compatible with high 
bandwidth optical networking infrastructure. We demonstrate a quantum encryption 
system, combining QKD with Mb/s key rates and encrypted data transport with a 
bandwidth of 200 Gb/s on the same fibre.  We combine QKD with dual polarisation 
quadrature phase shift keying (DP-QPSK) for the data channels for the first time. The 
system operates for fibres up to 101 km in length, sufficient for nearly all links found in 
metropolitan area networks.  Furthermore, we explore the effect of even higher data 
bandwidths, demonstrating that multiplexing QKD and up to 10 Tb/s of data is feasible 
for fibre lengths up to 50 km.  
Figure 1 illustrates the combined quantum and classical network layout with a single 
optical fibre link used to transmit traffic from both the QKD system (see Methods for 
details on the QKD protocol) and high speed encryptors (HSE). The quantum signals 
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are assigned to a single wavelength (1547.72 nm) on the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM)13 
grid corresponding to channel number 37. We use fibre optic wavelength multiplexers 
to combine the QKD signal with multiple data channels on the DWDM grid around 
1530 nm. 
 
Figure 1 Quantum secured system for ultra-high data bandwidth encryption. A 
high speed quantum key distribution (QKD) system is combined with a high speed 
classical data encryptor (HSE). Details of the QKD system can be found in Ref.14 and 
the working principle of the HSE can be found in Ref.15. The multiple wavelengths from 
the HSE are wavelength multiplexed using a dense wavelength division multiplexer 
(DWDM) before multiplexing with the quantum signals using a coarse wavelength 
division multiplexer (CWDM). Quantum signals on the receiver side are spectrally 
filtered using either a 100GHz or 25GHz spectral filter. Quantum keys generated by 
the QKD system are pushed symmetrically over Ethernet to the respective HSE’s. The 
quantum keys are used to encrypt the 2 × 100 Gb/s data traffic using the AES algorithm 
in real time. 
The data transport layer features HSE units with two 100G Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) encryptor line cards operating DP-QPSK with wavelengths (ITU grid 
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channel numbers) 1529.55 nm (60) and 1529.94 nm (60.5) respectively. We chose to 
adopt a DP-QPSK scheme15 as phase shift keying (PSK) permits a better optical signal 
to noise ratio of approximately 3dB than simple on-off keying (OOK) schemes for the 
same optical receiving power.15-16 We also remark the data transmission capacity of 
DP-QPSK is four times higher than that of OOK. We use wavelength divisional 
multiplexing to combine the data and quantum signals on a single fibre pair, with all 
forward directed traffic in the first fibre and the backward directed traffic in the second. 
This follows the usual practice of using a pair of fibres for bi-directional 
communication17. As well as conforming to the standard approach, this helps reduce 
noise on the quantum channel for fibre distances greater than about 25 km as Raman 
scattering due to strong data signals in the forward direction weakens due to fibre 
attenuation8. 
We have adapted the built-in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption on the 
100G line cards to accept symmetrically pushed quantum keys. This replaces the 
conventional public key exchange usually required to perform AES encryption. 512 
bits are extracted from the pushed key and half of these (i.e. 256 bits) are used by 
each 100G line card for AES encryption in counter mode18.  
To minimise the deleterious effect of Raman scattering into the quantum channel7-12, 
we employ a combination of spectral, temporal and optical power control. We reduce 
the launch power of the transmitters into the fibre by amplifying the data signals at the 
receiver side using an Erbium doped fibre amplifier. The launch power was chosen to 
maintain error free data transport after forward error correction.  The value depends 
on the fibre link loss; for example at a fibre distance of 50 km we set the launch power 
to -25.5 dBm (2.8 μW).  
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Raman scattering into the quantum channel is minimised by an optimised combination 
of spectral and temporal filtering. Temporal filtering is accomplished using self-
differencing19 operation of the avalanche photo-diodes (APDs) in the quantum 
receiver. When operated in self-differencing mode, the APDs can both detect very 
weak avalanches19 as well exhibit low avalanche signal evolution20. This means only 
avalanches occurring at the start of the clock edge contribute to photon counting which 
results in a short active on-time. Therefore single photon detectors based on self-
differencing APDs exhibit inherent temporal filtering. Temporal filtering results in an 
effective active on-time of around 125 ps, when the single photon detectors are gated 
at a repetition rate of 1 GHz. This means ~ 88% of Raman scattered photons are 
automatically rejected by temporal filtering through the self-differencing detection 
technique21. The quantum channel is also filtered spectrally using thin film filters with 
a nominal spectral width of either 100 GHz or 25 GHz (in the latter case, the measured 
full width at half maximum was 15 GHz).  
Figure 2 shows the dependence of the secure bit rate as a function of optical fibre 
distance up to 101 km in the presence of 2 × 100 Gbps forward directed encrypted 
data for the two types of filters. For the 100 GHz filter, a secure bit rate of 1.9 Mbps 
(1.2 Mbps) is observed for fibre distances of 35.5 km (50.5 km), sufficient to generate 
an AES-256 encryption key every 200 µs.  The corresponding fibre losses in these 
cases were 6.8 dB and 9.6dB respectively. 
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Figure 2 Fibre distance dependence. Experimental secure bit rate as a function of 
fibre distance in the presence of 2 × 100G forward directed classical data traffic over 
the same fibre (see Methods for details on the QKD protocol). Data is reported for two 
different filter widths, 100 GHz (blue circles) and 25 GHz (red circles). Corresponding 
sifted bit rates and quantum bit error rates are displayed as squares and triangles 
respectively. The solid and dashed lines are calculated using numerical simulation 
(see refs 8, 11 & 15 for more details).The simulation fully accounts for Raman forward 
scattering by the classical data traffic into the quantum channel. Error bar is two 
standard deviations. Effective fibre losses are shown on the top axis. Inset: Secure bit 
rate and data bit error rate (before forward error correction) for a duration of 2 hours 
at a fibre length of 101 km.  
Simulation of the secure bit rate with the 100 GHz filter shows that positive secure bit 
rates are not possible at 100 km (blue line, Figure 2). To elongate the range of the 
quantum encryption system, we exchange the 100 GHz filter in the quantum receiver 
for a 25 GHz filter (red circles). The effect of the narrower filter is better Raman noise 
rejection, as evidenced by the lower QBER at longer distances (red triangles). 
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Although the secure bit rates at shorter distances are now lower due to the higher loss 
of the 25 GHz filter, the reach is extended to 101 km (equivalent loss of 19.1dB) with 
a corresponding secure bit rate of 10 kbps. Continuous operation over 2 hours is also 
shown in the top panel of the inset, Figure 2.  This secure bit rate is still sufficient to 
refresh the AES encryption key every 25 ms.    
 
Figure 3 High bandwidth experimental simulation. a, Eight continuous wave (CW) 
optical transceivers are wavelength multiplexed with the original two 100G 
transceivers. Each transceiver operates on a separate wavelength of the 50GHz 
DWDM grid spanning 1529.55 nm → 1533.07 nm. The optical launch power of each 
transceiver is set using a variable optical attenuator (VOA) to -25.5 dBm. b, Secure bit 
rate as a function of time for 18 hours of continuous operation in the presence of 10 
classical data channels representing 1 Tbps of data traffic over the same fibre (blue 
circles). The corresponding quantum bit error rate (blue triangles) is also shown. Inset: 
Data bandwidth dependence of the secure bit rate and QBER from 0.1 → 1 Tbps. 
Solid and dashed lines are results from numerical simulation. 
We now explore the maximum data bandwidth that can co-exist with QKD signals. For 
this study, we populate the optical link with additional CW lasers operating at separate 
wavelengths to simulate Raman noise created by the additional data traffic. The 
arrangement is shown in Fig. 3a. Eight supplementary data lasers on a 50 GHz grid 
are multiplexed together with the original 100G transceivers using the DWDM 
combiner over the wavelength range 1530.33nm – 1533.07nm. A fibre with a length 
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of 50km and an average loss of 0.19dB/km is used. This distance was chosen since it 
is greater than the reach for typical 100G signal deployments, a reach specified to be 
transported across a link of up to 40km as per the IEEE standard22 (currently no 
standard exists for 1 Tbps or 10 Tbps data). We set the launch powers of the additional 
data lasers to the same level as the 100G transceivers; in this case -25.5 dBm (2.8 
µW). As before a 100 GHz optical filter is used to spectrally isolate the quantum signals 
at the quantum receiver side.  
Raising the power of the data lasers in the optical fibre link is expected to increase the 
Raman scatter and thereby deteriorate the QKD performance. However, the observed 
secure bit rate with all 10 transceivers switched on shows very little reduction. A secure 
bit rate of > 1 Mbps is achieved over a duration of 18 hours, Figure 3b, blue circles. 
This demonstrates that QKD can co-exist with 10 × 100G data channels, 
corresponding to an aggregate bandwidth of 1 Tbps.   
To investigate the ultimate bandwidth that can be combined with QKD, we increased 
the launch power of the 10 data lasers. This simulates the effect of adding additional 
data channels, provided that the noise in the quantum channel varies linearly with the 
data laser power. Furthermore, since the 100G channels are launched at a wavelength 
around 1530nm, this reflects the worst case of Raman scattering into a quantum 
channel wavelength of ~ 1550nm for the C-band wavelength range between 1530 and 
1565nm, since the Raman scattering coefficient for 1530nm is the highest. We also 
note the 25GHz filter can in principle have very high isolation – thus the Raman 
scattering effect into the quantum channel of adjacent classical channels would be the 
same as for non-adjacent classical channels. In the following experiment we ensure 
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that the total optical power is < 0 dBm so that any non-linear effects in the fibre are 
negligible12.  
 
Figure 4 Secure key bit rate data bandwidth dependence. Experimental secure bit 
rate as a function of data bandwidth simulated by increasing the launch power of 10 
data lasers. Experimental secure bit rate using a 100 GHz filter in the quantum receiver 
(blue circles), extending the results reported in the inset of Figure 3. Experimental 
secure bit rate data using a 25 GHz filter in the quantum receiver (red circles). Blue 
and red triangles are the corresponding QBERs for both experiments. Solid and 
dashed lines are results from numerical simulations. Also shown are secure bit rate 
numerical simulations using a 25 GHz filter in the quantum receiver for fibre distances 
of 25 km and 75 km (grey lines). 
 
We first look at extending the data bandwidth when using a 100GHz filter in the 
quantum receiver. Figure 4 shows the secure bit rate dependence on the 
experimentally simulated data bandwidth for this case (blue circles). Notice that QKD 
with a finite bit rate is possible for bandwidths up to 6 Tb/s. At these high simulated 
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data bandwidths almost all the contribution to the QBER (blue triangles) is due to 
Raman scattering from the data lasers. These results are improved further by use of 
a 25 GHz filter in the quantum receiver (red circles). In this case the data bandwidth 
can reach 10 Tb/s, along with a QKD key rate of 139 kb/s.  
Theoretical simulations, shown as solid lines in Figure 4, are plotted for three separate 
distances, 25 km, 50 km and 75 km. The longer distance of 75 km illustrates positive 
secure bit rates even beyond a simulated bandwidth of 1 Tb/s. The shorter distance 
of 25 km indicates the secure bit rate remains above 1 Mbps up to and beyond a 
simulated data bandwidth of 10 Tb/s. The experimental and theoretical simulated 
results far exceed those reported previously in the literature7-12 both in terms of data 
bandwidth and secure bit rate supported.  
Our results suggest that QKD can co-exist with very high volumes of data, in excess 
of 10 Tb/s for fibres up to 50 km, transmitted simultaneously on the same fibre.  This 
bandwidth is equivalent to one hundred 100 Gb/s data channels, sufficient to fill most 
of the C-band.  The secure key rate at 10 Tb/s is ~139 kb/s, which is adequate for sub-
second (~0.2 s) refresh of the AES encryption key on each of the one hundred 100G 
data channels. Our approach is particularly appropriate to applications such as off-site 
backup or data center interconnections, where many channels of homogenous traffic 
might naturally share the same transmission hardware over a point-to-point link and 
the optical launch power can be easily controlled. In the future the bandwidth of data 
multiplexed with QKD may be further increased by using multi-mode or multi-core 
optical fibre23-25.   
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Methods 
Quantum key distribution system. The QKD system is composed of two 19 inch 
rack units running a phase encoded BB84 protocol with efficient basis selection and 
decoy states in the finite key size regime14. The QKD transmitter uses pulses at a 
wavelength of 1547.72 nm and an average intensity of 0.4 photons/pulse for the signal 
states. Two decoy states are used with intensities of 0.1 and 7×10-3 photons/pulse. 
Phase encoding and decoding is achieved by the use of asymmetric Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers and the basis probabilities are set to the biased case of 31/32 and 1/32 
for the majority and minority bases respectively. An optical MHz clock signal is 
transmitted over the same fibre for synchronisation of the QKD transmitter and 
receiver. The QKD receiver contains two InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes 
operating in self-differencing mode3 clocked at 1 GHz with single photon efficiencies 
of 22.5% and dark count probabilities of 4.5×10-6. Simulations of the secure bit rates 
and QBERs in the presence of classical channels used experimentally determined 
scattering coefficients for each of the classical launched wavelengths. 
High Speed Encryptors. The HSE classical transport layer are two ADVA FSP3000 
19 inch rack units which house two 100G AES encryptor line cards each containing a 
C form-factor pluggable (CFP) transceiver operating quadrature phase shift keying 
and dual polarization (DP-QPSK) with wavelengths (ITU grid channel numbers) 
1529.55 nm (60) and 1529.94 nm (60.5) respectively. A 96 channel DWDM 
multiplexer/demultiplexer filter featuring an insertion loss of approximately 5 dB was 
used to combine the two HSE wavelengths, before mixing them with the quantum 
traffic by virtue of the CWDM multiplexing scheme. The HSE 100G AES line cards 
have built in forward error correction (FEC). To maintain post-FEC error free operation 
(BER ≤ 10-15), it is important that the pre-FEC bit error rate (BER) does not exceed the 
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FEC threshold of 1.9 × 10-2. We studied the pre-FEC BER at a fibre distance of 101 
km since this had the highest optical loss of any distance and any aggravating effects, 
such as degradation in the optical signal to noise ratio, would be strongest. As can be 
seen from the inset in Figure 2, the pre-FEC BER over a continuous duration of 2 
hours for a fibre distance of 101 km was very stable, at an average value of 2.2 × 10-
3 which is almost a factor of ten less than the pre-FEC threshold. The QKD generated 
keys at both the QKD transmitter and QKD receiver sides are pushed over their local 
communication interfaces to their respective high speed encryptors. These keys are 
then used by replacing the usual publically exchanged keys for the AES encryption 
algorithm to create a symmetrically enabled AES encryption link. 
Multiplexing scheme.  We choose to take advantage of the naturally low insertion 
loss of around 1 dB7 for Coarse Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CWDM) to combine 
the quantum communication with the classical communication. Although CWDM 
technology is designed to support up to only 8 usable wavelength channels (around 
the low loss fibre wavelength of 1550nm), it can be adapted to work in conjunction with 
DWDM architecture. The CWDM channel bands are around 18 nm wide indicating 
they can support up to 22 DWDM 100 GHz spaced channels or 44 DWDM 50 GHz 
spaced channels in each band26. In fact, using just two CWDM wavelength bands 
(1530 nm and 1550 nm), almost the entire 50 GHz DWDM spaced ITU C-band can be 
populated. All forward directed signals: quantum signal, the QKD synchronization 
signal, QKD reconciliation data signal and classical channels for ultra-high bandwidth 
secured data transmission are transmitted over a single fibre. The two filters used in 
the experiments feature insertion losses of 0.9dB (100GHz filter) and 2dB (25GHz 
filter). 
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